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Shield law no bar to a notice to produce: redaction can protect a journalist's source

The Supreme Court of NSW refused to set aside a notice to produce said to undermine journalist's privilege, holding it targeted a different issue and that any source-identifying material could be redacted.

In AB v CD (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1483, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Richmond J) dismissed, with costs, an application by a media publisher and a journalist to set aside a notice to produce. They argued that the notice was an abuse of process because it would undermine the journalist's privilege over a confidential source under s 126K of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The Court held that the notice was aimed at something else, namely whether another party knew about the proceedings, and that any material identifying the source could be redacted. The reasons were given ex tempore (orally, at the end of the hearing) and later revised. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Journalists in New South Wales can claim a statutory privilege, often called a "shield law", that protects the identity of their confidential sources. This ruling shows that the privilege does not automatically defeat every court process aimed at a media organisation. If a notice to produce is directed at a different, relevant issue, the usual answer is to produce the documents with the source-identifying parts redacted, not to set the notice aside.

At a glance

  • Court and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Duty List, Richmond J (first instance, interlocutory)
  • Area of law: Civil procedure (notices to produce; abuse of process); evidence (journalist's privilege, Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126K)
  • Decision type: Notice of motion to set aside a notice to produce, heard 12 November 2026, decided ex tempore on 13 November 2026 (reasons revised)
  • Outcome: The motion was dismissed with costs ([13])
  • Standard applied: Whether the documents sought have "apparent relevance" to the issues, and whether the notice solely seeks apparently privileged documents ([5], [10])
  • Anonymisation: the Court uses AB, CD and EF; this digest keeps that and refers to the publisher and journalist by role only

🧩 Facts and Issues

Background

The plaintiff, AB, started the proceedings in late October 2026, after a news article was published by the second defendant (the publisher) and written by the third defendant, EF (the journalist). AB alleges that the article revealed confidential information belonging to him, and that the information was held by the first defendant, CD ([2]). These are allegations; the Court has not determined them.

The Court made urgent orders against CD, including for delivery up of certain property and for discovery. The papers and orders were emailed to addresses the plaintiff believed she used ([3]). When she did not comply or appear, the plaintiff was given leave to bring a contempt motion against her, which was set down for hearing on 19 November 2026 ([3]). The contempt charge had not been decided when this ruling was given, and nothing in it is a finding that CD breached any order.

The notice to produce

On 10 November 2026 AB served a notice to produce on the publisher and the journalist. It asked for copies of any communications referring to these proceedings between them (or anyone on their behalf) and CD (or anyone on her behalf) since 27 October 2026, the day the proceedings began ([1]).

What each side argued

The publisher and the journalist said the notice was an abuse of process for two reasons ([4]):

  • it sought to undermine the privilege they claimed under s 126K over the confidentiality of the article's source; and
  • the date range went back before the contempt motion, so the documents had no apparent relevance to it.

AB said the communications went to whether CD knew about the proceedings and the orders, which is a central issue on the contempt motion ([6], [8]).

The issues

  • Did the documents sought have apparent relevance to the contempt motion?
  • Was the notice an abuse of process because it sought to undermine journalist's privilege under s 126K?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Rules and Principles

  • Notices to produce and apparent relevance: Apart from privilege, a notice to produce is not an abuse of process if the documents have an "apparent relevance" to the issues. That test is met if the documents will likely add, in some way, to the relevant evidence, including by assisting in cross-examination or going to credit, even if they may not themselves be admissible ([5]).
  • Abuse of process and privilege: A subpoena or notice to produce is an abuse of process if it solely seeks apparently privileged documents ([10]).
  • Journalist's privilege (s 126K): Section 126K protects the confidentiality of a journalist's source. Neither the journalist nor their employer can be compelled by a court to produce a document that would disclose the source's identity or enable it to be worked out. Generally, however, the court may override that protection if disclosure is in the public interest ([9]).
  • Production, then access: Producing documents to the court under a notice is a separate step from a party getting access to them. Access requires a further application under r 34.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) ([12]).
  • Redaction: For discovery, parts of documents covered by a valid privilege claim may be redacted to preserve the privilege ([12]).
  • Discovery overlap: Under UCPR r 21.1, a discovery order does not extend to documents created after the proceedings began, so this notice did not overlap with the earlier discovery order ([8]).

📌 Authorities Relied On

  • Secretary of the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council (2021) 118 NSWLR 336; [2021] NSWCA 145 at [80], [89]: the "apparent relevance" test for notices to produce, which includes material useful for cross-examination or credit ([5]).
  • Xinfeng Australia International Investment Pty Ltd v GR Capital Group Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 620 at [39]: a subpoena or notice that solely seeks apparently privileged documents is an abuse of process ([10]).
  • Telstra Corp Ltd v Australis Media Holdings (Supreme Court (NSW), McLelland CJ in Eq, 10 February 1997, unreported) and In the matter of Prismex Technologies Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 278 at [5]: privileged parts of documents can be redacted for discovery ([12]).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Should the notice to produce be set aside as an abuse of process, either because the documents lacked apparent relevance or because the notice undermined the journalist's privilege under s 126K?

Rule

A notice to produce stands if the documents have apparent relevance to the issues ([5]). It will be an abuse of process if it solely seeks apparently privileged documents ([10]). Section 126K protects documents that would disclose a confidential source's identity or allow it to be worked out ([9]).

Application

The communications were apparently relevant to the contempt motion

The Court found that the communications went to whether CD had notice of the proceedings and, in particular, of the orders whose alleged breach was the subject of the contempt charge ([6]). The material could cut either way. If it showed she had notice, AB would rely on it. If nothing was produced, or what was produced did not suggest notice, the Court would take that into account in deciding whether the charge was made out ([6]).

The date range was not a problem

The notice covered communications from 28 October 2026 onwards, which was clearly after the proceedings started. Communications from that time were relevant to whether the email service had actually brought the proceedings, the orders and the contempt motion to CD's attention, given AB's allegation that she was evading service ([7]). As AB put it, the real issue was whether substituted service had worked, or whether CD knew of the proceedings and had chosen not to attend ([8]). The notice also did not overlap with the earlier discovery order, which did not cover documents created after the proceedings began ([8]).

The notice did not solely seek privileged documents

Under the Xinfeng principle, the question was whether the notice solely sought documents privileged under s 126K ([10]). The Court held it did not ([11]). The notice was not aimed at communications that would reveal the article's source. It sought communications about these proceedings, from a period after the alleged breach of confidentiality had already happened ([11]). The Court noted that AB had a suspicion about the source, but the publisher and the journalist did not concede it and continued to maintain the source's confidentiality ([11]).

A "theoretical possibility" of revealing the source did not justify setting the notice aside

The Court accepted that documents produced might, in theory, contain a reference to the source ([12]). It gave three reasons why that did not change the result:

  • the notice was not directed at revealing the source, so it was not an abuse of process ([12]);
  • there was no evidence that the notice would reveal the source, so the risk was "mere speculation" ([12]); and
  • producing documents to the Court is only the first step, because AB would need a separate application under UCPR r 34.2 to get access to them ([12]).

Most importantly, the Court saw "no reason in principle" why the publisher and the journalist could not redact parts of a responsive communication that would disclose the source's identity or allow it to be worked out, just as privileged parts of documents can be redacted for discovery ([12]). The parties can be heard on redaction if it arises ([12]).

Conclusion

The notice was not an abuse of process or otherwise liable to be set aside, so the motion was dismissed with costs ([13]).

🏛️ Outcome, Orders and Costs

The second and third defendants' notice of motion dated 12 November 2026 was dismissed with costs ([13]). The next steps are production of any responsive documents to the Court, with any redaction issues to be argued if they arise, and a separate access application by AB ([12]). The contempt motion against CD was listed for hearing on 19 November 2026 and had not been decided ([3]).

🧭 Practical Lessons

  • For journalists and media organisations: Section 126K protects a source's identity, not every document a journalist holds. A notice aimed at a different, relevant issue is unlikely to be set aside just because a source might be mentioned ([9], [11]–[12]).
  • For journalists and media organisations: Plan to protect the source through redaction rather than relying only on a motion to set aside ([12]).
  • For self-represented litigants: A notice to produce should be tied to an issue in the case. Seeking documents that will "add, in some way or another" to the evidence, including on credit, meets the apparent relevance test ([5]–[6]).
  • For practitioners: Frame the notice around the issue, such as notice of proceedings in a contempt motion, and set a date range that matches it ([1], [7]–[8]). Remember that production to the Court and access under UCPR r 34.2 are separate steps ([12]).

🔗 Related on AISLES

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

  • Journalist's privilege protects the identity of a confidential source; it is not a blanket shield against court processes.
  • A notice to produce directed at a different, relevant issue will usually stand, even if a source might be mentioned in the documents.
  • Redaction, not setting the notice aside, is the ordinary way to protect the source.
"The shield law protects the source, not every document. Redact what would reveal the source, and produce the rest."

This digest is general information about a published judgment, not legal advice. For advice about your own situation, speak to a lawyer, Legal Aid or a community legal centre.

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