Harbour flotilla not prohibited: assembly rights outweighed real safety concerns
In Commissioner of Police (NSW Police Force) v Hodgson [2026] NSWSC 1452, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Muston J) refused an application by the Commissioner of Police to prohibit a planned public assembly on Newcastle Harbour. The Court accepted that the Commissioner's safety and disruption concerns were legitimate, but held that the public interest in political expression through assembly outweighed them. Participants who held the event substantially in accordance with the notice would keep the qualified immunity in the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.
Why it matters: In New South Wales, organisers can notify police of a public assembly. If the notice is in order and the event is held substantially as notified, participants have a qualified immunity from certain offences, including obstructing a person, vehicle or vessel in a public place. Police can still ask a court to prohibit the assembly. This case shows that, for an on-water protest, real safety risks, a missing marine licence and some disruption all matter, but they do not automatically justify a ban.
At a glance
- Court and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, Muston J (first instance, not an appeal)
- Area of law: Public assemblies (Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) Part 4); marine safety; police powers
- Decision type: Application under s 25 to prohibit a public assembly, heard 11 November 2026, decided 13 November 2026
- Outcome: The prohibition order was refused; the Commissioner was ordered to pay the defendant's costs ([62])
- Standard applied: The Act sets out no criteria. The Court balances free speech and public assembly against competing public interests, including safety and free passage ([25]–[26])
🧩 Facts and Issues
Background
The defendant served a notice under s 23(1) of the Summary Offences Act on 17 September 2026, on behalf of Rising Tide, a Newcastle climate activist group that protests against the Port of Newcastle being used as a coal export facility. The Commissioner accepted that the notice met s 23 ([1]–[2]). The assembly was planned for 14 November 2026 at Horseshoe Beach. From 11:00am, a flotilla of up to 785 people on kayaks and other watercraft would enter the harbour, display a floating message opposing coal exports, then form a line of craft across the main shipping channel for about 30 to 40 minutes for photographs, returning by about 1:30pm. The notice described a short, "family-friendly" event, said it was not a "harbour blockade", and promoted "no civil disobedience" ([3]–[8]). The defendant estimated about 888 attendees, including about 720 people on the water, but the organisers could not keep unregistered people out or compel anyone to leave ([9]–[16]).
How the case got here
The Commissioner filed a summons on 5 November 2026 seeking a prohibition order under s 25 ([1]). In November 2024 the Court had prohibited a Rising Tide event in Commissioner of Police v Coglin [2024] NSWSC 1412, but that proposal was a 30-hour blockade of the shipping channel with a land-based encampment, which the Court treated as materially different ([17]).
What each side argued
The Commissioner accepted that the organisers and likely participants held deep and sincere concerns about fossil fuels and climate change, and did not dispute the significance of that issue ([27]). He pointed to a significant risk to human safety, the absence of an aquatic licence, the "inevitable" interruption of shipping, and a history of civil disobedience which, he said, made compliance uncertain ([28]–[29], [55]). The organisers said the event was not a blockade, would be short, and would be run with a safety plan, and that no aquatic licence was required ([8], [48], [57]).
The issues
- Should the Court prohibit the notified assembly under s 25, given the safety, licensing, disruption and compliance concerns, when weighed against the public interest in political assembly?
⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Rules and Principles
- Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW), Part 4. A "public assembly" is an assembly held in a "public place", which includes a place covered by water (ss 3, 22). This assembly fell within that definition ([19]).
- A notice under s 23, signed by a person who takes responsibility for the assembly, can make it an "authorised public assembly". The Commissioner accepted that this notice was in order ([2], [20]).
- If the authorised assembly is held substantially in accordance with the notice, s 24 gives participants a qualified immunity from offences relating to unlawful assembly or the obstruction of a person, vehicle or vessel in a public place. It does not remove other powers, including a police safety direction under the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s 200(3), or on-water powers such as the Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), s 15A ([21]–[22]).
- Under s 25, the Commissioner may apply to this Court or the District Court to prohibit the assembly where the notice was served at least seven days beforehand. A prohibition order means the s 24 immunity is not engaged, and a knowing breach is contempt ([23]–[24]). The Act sets out no criteria. The Court balances free speech and public assembly against competing interests, including public safety and the free passage of vessels ([25]–[26]).
- Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), s 18(1): a person must not conduct an "aquatic activity" without an aquatic licence. That term includes an exhibition in navigable waters, and any activity reasonably likely to substantially affect navigation ([45]–[46]).
📌 Authorities Relied On
- Commissioner of Police (NSW Police Force) v Naser (2025) 118 NSWLR 290; [2025] NSWCA 224: a knowing breach of a s 25 order is a contempt ([24]); the s 25 balancing test and the fundamental importance of political assembly ([25]); and a contrast with crowd-crush risks ([33]).
- Commissioner of Police v Coglin [2024] NSWSC 1412: a previous Rising Tide event was prohibited, but it was a 30-hour blockade with a land encampment and was materially different ([17]).
- Commissioner of Police v Langosch [2012] NSWSC 499: preserving the free passage of vehicles, and by inference marine vessels ([26]).
- Commissioner of Police v Jackson [2015] NSWSC 96: the need to protect the public and police from violent and unlawful behaviour ([26]).
🧠 Analysis
Issue
Should the Court prohibit this notified harbour flotilla under s 25, given the Commissioner's concerns about safety, the absence of an aquatic licence, interruption of shipping, and possible non-compliance?
Rule
Section 25 confers a power with no statutory checklist. The Court balances the public interest in political assembly against competing interests, including public safety and the free passage of vessels ([25]–[26], [61]).
Application
The safety risks were real, but they could be reasonably moderated
The principal consideration in favour of a ban was safety. The Court accepted that an on-water accident might be unlikely, but the consequences could be catastrophic, and that this was not like a traditional street or park protest ([30]–[31]). It accepted risks of collision, crowding of small craft, a large ship having to deviate, and hypothermia or changing weather ([32]–[33]). Most of those risks arose from an individual's decision to enter the water, unlike a crowd crush, and were, "to a reasonable degree", moderated by participants' own decisions, a written safety plan, and police on the water. No expert evidence assessed how effective the plan would be, but the Court was satisfied the organisers had made a genuine and meaningful attempt to reduce the risks ([33]–[39]).
Large ships were unlikely, and short disruption did not justify a ban
Within the parameters of the proposed assembly, interaction with large ships or tugboats was most unlikely ([40]). The organisers did not intend to "blockade" the harbour, and Port Authority information as at 9 November 2026 showed no shipping movements scheduled during the on-water window ([41]). The Harbour Master, whose paramount consideration was safety and who alone can permit shipping movements, would not permit any large vessel to move through the channel while the on-water component was scheduled ([42]).
The Court accepted that interruption of shipping was an "inevitable consequence" with economic consequences, but the evidence did not point to any particular shipping movement that would in fact be interrupted ([50]). Some disruption to other small vessels would be unavoidable, as with almost any public gathering, but the relatively short time the line would span the channel did not weigh heavily in favour of a ban ([51]–[54]). Social media talk of violent "counterprotesters" was not all dismissed, but police would be present either way ([43]–[44]).
The missing aquatic licence mattered, but it was not decisive
The Commissioner submitted that the flotilla was an "aquatic activity" requiring a licence, and that without one there had been no orderly safety assessment under the marine legislation ([47]). The organisers said no licence was required ([48]). The Court found the event was "plainly an aquatic activity", so it was difficult to see how a licence was not required ([49]). That failure was not determinative, but the decision not to apply, after police advised that a licence was likely required, was still a factor when assessing concerns about civil disobedience ([49]).
Past civil disobedience did not mean this event should be prohibited
The Commissioner's doubts about compliance were "not without substance": previous Rising Tide events had involved civil disobedience, and one organiser was said to have spoken of attracting international media attention ([55]–[56]). This event, however, had been publicised as involving no civil disobedience and no harbour blockade, and as "family friendly", in order to build public support ([57]). Rising Tide had also secured support from the Australian Conservation Foundation on the basis that the paddle-out would be lawful, and so had "potentially more to lose than its reputation" if disobedience were condoned ([58]). Any acts beyond the notice would not enjoy the s 24 immunity, and the Court was not satisfied that a prohibition order would necessarily reduce that risk in any material way ([59]–[60]).
Conclusion
The Court was satisfied that the public interest in facilitating political expression through assembly outweighed the Commissioner's legitimate concerns. It was not satisfied that participants — to the extent the event was conducted in accordance with the notice — ought to be deprived of the protections in the Summary Offences Act ([61]).
🏛️ Outcome, Orders and Costs
The order sought by the Commissioner was refused. The Commissioner was ordered to pay the defendant's costs ([62]). The judgment does not indicate any further hearing. The assembly was planned for the following day, 14 November 2026 ([1]).
🧭 Practical Lessons
- For self-represented litigants: A valid s 23 notice is the starting point for an authorised assembly and the s 24 immunity, but only if the event is then held substantially as notified ([20]–[21], [61]).
- For self-represented litigants: The immunity does not cover civil disobedience or conduct outside the notice, and it does not take away other police or marine safety powers ([22], [60]).
- For self-represented litigants: Not every on-water protest will be allowed. A longer blockade has been prohibited before. Safety planning, and evidence about how shipping will be managed, mattered here ([17], [37]–[42]).
- For practitioners: Section 25 has no statutory criteria; the Naser balancing exercise applies ([25]–[26]). A missing licence was not decisive, but it was relevant to compliance concerns ([49]). Past disobedience is relevant, but so is whether a ban would materially reduce the risk of people going beyond the notice ([56]–[60]).
🧠 Take-Home Lesson
- A notified public assembly is not prohibited just because it is risky or inconvenient.
- The Court balances the right to political assembly against real concerns about safety, order and free passage.
- The Act's protection applies only if the event is held substantially as notified, and it does not remove other police or marine safety powers.
"The right to assemble and speak is fundamental, but it is not automatic. The Court weighs it against real safety and order concerns, and it only protects an assembly held substantially as notified."
This digest is general information about a published judgment, not legal advice. For advice about your own situation, speak to a lawyer, Legal Aid or a community legal centre.