Airport officer who saw a fatal crash then watched the CCTV is owed a duty

In Salma v Transport Accident Commission [2026] VSC 688, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Tsalamandris J, Common Law Division, Personal Injuries List) decided whether a negligent driver owed a duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury to an airport control-room officer who saw and heard a fatal collision, then repeatedly viewed the CCTV as part of coordinating the emergency response. The Court held that a duty was owed, and that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for his psychiatric injury. The important point is that this was not framed as a novel duty to anyone who later watches crash footage: the officer's first-hand sensory perception, his workplace role and the immediate aftermath were treated together. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Psychiatric injury claims after someone else's death or injury turn on reasonable foreseeability. This ruling shows a duty can arise where the plaintiff was not a traditional "rescuer" at the wreck, but still saw and heard a major crash and then had to watch graphic footage as part of the emergency response ([92]–[96]).

At a glance

• Court and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Common Law Division, Personal Injuries List (single judge, first instance)
• Area of law: Negligence; psychiatric injury (nervous shock); duty of care
• Decision type: Trial judgment on liability (duty); quantum agreed if duty found
• Outcome: Duty owed; plaintiff entitled to damages for psychiatric injury ([6], [96])
• Standard of proof: Balance of probabilities (actual persuasion under the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 140) ([82])
• Costs: Not dealt with in these reasons; form of orders still to be heard ([100])

🧩 Facts and Issues

Background

On 30 June 2021, Dennis Wu drove through a red light at Terminal Drive and Centre Road in the landside precinct of Tullamarine Airport and collided with a double tipper truck. Mr Wu died. His passenger was seriously injured. The accident was due to his negligence in failing to obey the red light ([1], [9]–[13]).

The plaintiff, Omran Salma, was a Wilson Security landside operations control room officer. He was standing outside the control room when the crash happened. He alleges he witnessed it first-hand, then went inside, coordinated the emergency response, and repeatedly viewed the CCTV. He claims psychiatric injury and seeks damages from the Transport Accident Commission, which indemnifies Mr Wu under s 94(7) of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) (the TAA) ([2]).

How the case got here

• The defendant admits that Mr Wu owed a duty of reasonable care to other road users, drove negligently, and that his negligence caused the accident ([3]).
• It disputes that Mr Salma witnessed the accident first-hand, and denies liability for psychiatric injury from what he observed that day ([3]).
• The trial ran over three days and included a view of the accident site. Mr Salma and his colleague Mohammed Jaffer gave evidence ([5], [17]).
• Mr Salma had earlier obtained County Court leave to commence a common law proceeding under TAA s 93 ([38]).

What each side argued

• The plaintiff asked the Court to accept that he saw and heard the accident first-hand, knew it was a collision before viewing the CCTV, and that viewing the footage was part of the immediate aftermath. He said Mr Wu owed a duty to those who witnessed the accident and its aftermath and who had to coordinate the emergency response, including repeatedly watching the footage ([62]–[65]). He relied on Wicks, Tame and related authorities on foreseeability and rescuers ([64]–[66]).
• The defendant said the Court should find he did not know there had been an accident until he saw the CCTV; that from the distance he stood, psychiatric injury from what he saw and heard was not reasonably foreseeable; and that a duty to anyone who sees any aspect of a distant collision, or anyone who later watches CCTV, would be owed to an indeterminate class ([68]–[74]). It characterised the claimed duty as novel ([71]).

The issues

• Whether Mr Salma witnessed the accident first-hand and, if not, what he witnessed ([4(a)]).
• Whether Mr Wu owed him a duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury in the circumstances alleged — in particular, whether psychiatric injury to a person in his position was reasonably foreseeable ([4(b)]).
• Breach was conceded if a duty was found ([97]). Quantum was agreed if a duty was found ([99]).

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Rules and Principles

• Under the TAA, "injury" includes a mental injury and nervous shock suffered by a person who was directly involved in the transport accident or who witnessed it or its immediate aftermath. The defendant did not contend that this definition prevented recovery. The claim was defended on the duty question ([83]).
• Whether a duty of care is owed is a question of law ([84]).
• The central question, drawn from Tame v New South Wales and reaffirmed in Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW), is whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of the plaintiff sustaining a recognisable psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable ([86]–[87], [90]).
• Sudden shock and direct perception of a distressing phenomenon or its aftermath are no longer preconditions to liability for psychiatric injury, though they remain relevant considerations ([85], [66]).
• For rescuers, foreseeability is judged before the accident happened, by reference to an accident of the kind that might result from the defendant's negligence, and to the sights, sounds and tasks a rescuer might face ([88]).
• Proximity is no longer the touchstone of duty, but it still focuses the inquiry on the features of the relationship and the facts. Categories of earlier cases are a guide, not a substitute for assessing reasonableness on the particular facts (King v Philcox; Tsiragakis v Mallet) ([89], [91]).

📌 Authorities Relied On

• Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2010) 241 CLR 60: the central foreseeability question for mental harm, and how to frame foresight of harm to rescuers ([64], [87]–[88]).
• Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 (including Annetts): sudden shock and direct perception are not preconditions; foreseeability and the relationship between the parties ([85]–[86]).
• King v Philcox (2015) 255 CLR 304: how to evaluate whether a duty arises, with proximity focusing the inquiry ([89]).
• Tsiragakis v Mallet (2025) 77 VR 324: the same central foreseeability test; prior categories do not replace a fact-specific assessment; on the agreed facts of that case, no duty was found ([90]–[91]).
• Mt Isa Mines v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383: cited by the defendant in contrasting a co-worker who saw severe burns ([73]).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Did Mr Wu owe Mr Salma a duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury in these circumstances?

Rule

A duty to take reasonable care to avoid recognisable psychiatric injury exists where, in all the circumstances, that risk was reasonably foreseeable. Sudden shock and direct perception are relevant but not essential. The court evaluates the particular facts; it does not invent a duty owed to an indeterminate class of CCTV viewers ([86]–[92]).

Application

What the plaintiff saw, heard and then had to do

The Court found Mr Salma a credible witness whose difficulty communicating helped explain inconsistencies in earlier accounts ([77]–[79]). It was actually persuaded that he faced the intersection with an unobstructed view; saw a flash of white, the truck's sudden braking, smoke and debris; heard an extremely loud bang; was shaken and frightened; believed an accident had occurred before entering the control room; and that his job required him to coordinate the emergency response, including viewing and zooming the CCTV to count passengers ([82]). Mr Jaffer corroborated key parts ([81]). The CCTV was confronting: the vehicle became entrapped between truck and trailer ([82(i)]).

Not a novel "anyone who watches CCTV" duty

The Court rejected the defendant's characterisation of the claim as novel. This was not a case about a duty to avoid psychiatric injury to anyone who watches CCTV of a fatal collision after the event, nor a duty to anyone who sees any aspect of a distant collision without fearing for their own safety or being exposed to human suffering ([92]).

The footage was not watched in a vacuum

Mr Salma had a sudden sensory perception of things consistent with a major collision. Even if the Court were wrong about what he believed before viewing the footage, nothing turned on that: he viewed the confronting footage within moments of seeing and hearing the accident, remained in close proximity to the scene, and was conscious of the victims being trapped a short distance away while he coordinated the response ([93]). Whether his knowledge was instantaneous or affirmed within minutes as he did his job, he had seen and heard enough, in the immediate aftermath, to be someone the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen was at risk of psychiatric injury ([94]).

Airport emergency staff were a foreseeable class

Mr Wu had been speeding and ran a red light at a busy airport intersection. It was reasonably foreseeable that a person in the class of airport workers responsible for the emergency response to a major collision might suffer psychiatric injury of the kind that eventuated, from seeing and hearing the accident and undertaking tasks of the kind Mr Salma performed ([95]). He was not a "rescuer" in the traditional sense, but his duties required him to coordinate the rescue efforts, including viewing graphic CCTV after first-hand perception of the crash ([94], [96]).

Breach and medical evidence followed the duty finding

Breach was conceded if a duty was found ([97]). Medical reports supporting psychiatric injury from what he saw and heard, and from the control-room aftermath, were noted. An opinion premised on CCTV-only witnessing did not accord with the Court's findings and was treated as irrelevant ([98]).

Conclusion

The circumstances did not fall neatly into earlier categories: Mr Salma was not in a close relationship with the deceased or the passenger, and he was not directly confronted at the scene with human suffering. Even so, psychiatric injury to a person in his position was reasonably foreseeable, and a duty of care was owed ([96]).

🏛️ Outcome, Orders and Costs

• A duty of care was owed by Mr Wu to Mr Salma, and Mr Salma is entitled to recover damages for his psychiatric injuries ([6], [96]).
• Breach was admitted once duty was found ([97]).
• The parties had agreed the quantum of damages if duty was established; the judgment does not state the figure ([99]).
• The Court will hear the parties as to the form of orders ([100]). Costs are not dealt with in these reasons.

🧭 Practical Lessons

• For self-represented litigants: A psychiatric injury claim after someone else's crash is not won by saying you later saw footage. The court looks at what you saw and heard, your role in the immediate aftermath, and whether that kind of harm was reasonably foreseeable. Labels such as "rescuer" or "bystander" are starting points only ([94]–[96]).
• For practitioners: If the defence casts the claim as a novel indeterminate CCTV-watching duty, meet that with findings about first-hand perception, proximity and occupational response tasks ([92]–[95]). Medical opinions that assume a contested premise (here, CCTV-only witnessing) may fall away once that premise fails ([98]).
• For practitioners: Agreeing quantum if liability is found shortens the trial, but the published reasons may then omit the figure ([99], fn 1).

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

• Psychiatric injury duty is about foreseeability on the whole facts, not about inventing a duty for every CCTV viewer.
• First-hand sight and sound of a major crash, plus immediate work duties that include watching the footage, can found a duty even where the plaintiff is not a traditional roadside rescuer.

"Watching crash CCTV as work duty after you saw and heard the collision is not footage in a vacuum."

This digest is general information about a published judgment, not legal advice. For advice about your own situation, speak to a lawyer, Legal Aid or a community legal centre.