Parity, youth and a guilty plea: sentencing two 17-year-olds for the murder of a 14-year-old boy

In DPP v DM & KA [2026] VSC 686, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Fox J, Criminal Division) sentenced two young men for the murder of a 14-year-old boy in June 2023, when all three offenders were 17. DM was found guilty by a jury. KA pleaded guilty. A third offender, AB, had already been sentenced by another judge. The result was that KA received 17 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months, and DM received 18 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 14 years. The important point is how a court keeps co-offenders' sentences consistent (the parity principle) while still giving real weight to youth, disadvantaged backgrounds, mental health, remorse and a guilty plea. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: The case shows how youth, the Bugmy and Verdins principles, a guilty plea and parity with an earlier sentence all fit together when the offence is as serious as murder. ([65], [69]).

At a glance

• Court and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Criminal Division (sentencing at first instance)
• Area of law: Criminal law; sentencing of young offenders for murder
• Decision type: Sentencing remarks after a jury verdict (DM) and a plea of guilty (KA)
• Outcome: KA, 17 years with a 12 years 6 months non-parole period; DM, 18 years 6 months with a 14-year non-parole period; 1,203 days of pre-sentence detention declared for each ([70]–[71])
• Key principles: parity with co-offender AB; youth; Bugmy; Verdins; the guilty plea discount; current sentencing practices ([42], [60], [64]–[69])
• Plea declaration for KA: but for the plea, 20 years with a 16-year non-parole period ([72])

🧩 Facts and Issues

Background

Both offenders were convicted of murder, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment ([1]–[2]). Because both were under 18 at the time, the standard sentence provisions did not apply, but the Court still had to have regard to the specified standard non-parole period (footnote 2).

The victim was a 14-year-old boy who was walking with his friends. The judge described the offending as extremely grave and noted that all three offenders "were still children yourselves" at the time ([3]–[4]). There was no connection between the two groups, and nothing explained why the boy was chosen ([9]). In general terms, DM deliberately drove a car at the boy, and KA and AB then attacked him with weapons ([3], [23]–[25]). The detailed facts are at [7]–[19].

The third offender, AB, pleaded guilty and had earlier been sentenced by Jane Dixon J to 17 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years ([5]). Fox J agreed entirely with that judge's remarks about the offending ([6]).

How the case got here

All three were arrested in July 2023 and gave "no comment" interviews. DM did not give or call evidence at trial ([20]). KA pleaded guilty on 15 May 2026 ([1]). The judge noted "unfortunate and considerable delay", partly because of a plea-related application by DM and questions about KA's fitness to stand trial ([35], footnote 15).

What each side argued

• DM's counsel argued that he should be sentenced on the less serious basis of complicity, and that the Court could not be sure he drove at the group deliberately ([21]–[22]).
• KA's counsel argued that KA was less culpable than AB to a "modest extent", while the prosecution said there was no real basis to distinguish their roles ([27]).
• Both offenders relied on their disadvantaged childhoods (Bugmy), and KA also relied on his mental health (Verdins) ([42], [55], [60]).

The issues

• What were each offender's role and level of culpability?
• How much do youth, disadvantage and mental health reduce the sentence for a murder this serious?
• How should the sentences relate to AB's earlier sentence, given the differences in pleas, roles and remorse?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Rules and Principles

• Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5: the sentencing purposes and factors, including culpability and degree of responsibility (footnote 12).
• Section 6AAA: the court must state the sentence it would have imposed but for a guilty plea ([72]).
• Section 18: pre-sentence detention is declared as time served ([70]–[71]).
• Bugmy: childhood deprivation can reduce moral culpability, although the same factors may increase the weight given to community protection ([42], [55]).
• Verdins: mental illness can bear on culpability (limb one) and can make imprisonment more burdensome (limb five) ([44], [60]–[61]).
• Youth: immaturity reduces blameworthiness, but its mitigating effect decreases as the gravity of the offending increases ([65]).
• Parity: co-offenders should, if other things are equal, receive the same sentence ([67]).

📌 Authorities Relied On

• DPP v AB [2025] VSC 213: the co-offender's sentence and the parity benchmark ([5], [66]).
• Cheung v The Queen: the judge must make findings where the verdict does not reveal the basis of liability (footnote 7, [22]).
• Bugmy v The Queen: childhood deprivation and moral culpability ([42]).
• R v Verdins: mental impairment in sentencing ([44], [60]).
• CNK v The Queen and R v Ung: youth, immaturity and the limits of youth as mitigation (footnotes 25–26, [65]).
• R v Grmusa: personal factors in parity (footnote 29, [67]).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

How to set sentences for two 17-year-old co-offenders that properly reflect their roles, their personal circumstances and KA's plea, while remaining consistent with the sentence already imposed on AB.

Rule

The sentence must reflect the gravity of the offence and each offender's culpability, taking into account youth, Bugmy and Verdins factors, remorse, rehabilitation and any guilty plea. Parity requires that like cases be treated alike, but genuine differences between co-offenders can justify different sentences ([26], [65], [67]).

Application

Roles and culpability

The judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that DM drove deliberately at the group, and that he was party to an agreement to kill ([23]–[24]). DM's role was essential, because the attack could not have happened without it ([24]). The judge found that the roles of KA and AB were equivalent. It was "unrealistic" to distinguish between two people carrying out the same agreed attack based on small differences in timing or the number of blows ([28]). DM's role was "slightly less" because he did not take part in the killing itself, but it was still "essential and significant" ([29]). Burning the car afterwards was an aggravating factor for DM and AB, but not for KA. It did not provide much basis to distinguish between the three ([30]).

Victim impact

The judge recorded the profound and continuing grief of the boy's family, as described in victim impact statements given over 18 months, and said the family's pain "is never ending" ([31]–[35]).

DM's circumstances

The judge accepted that DM's childhood disadvantage enlivened Bugmy "in a general sense" ([42]), but found that no limb of Verdins applied ([44]). His criminal history was the least serious of the three, but it was not insignificant ([45]). The judge did not accept that he had any real remorse, and noted that he had not taken responsibility for his role. However, the judge was conscious that he is "still young and capable of change" ([47]–[48]). The judge also took 118 days of earlier remand time into account "in a broad sense" ([49]).

KA's circumstances

KA's childhood involved extreme deprivation, and the judge accepted that Bugmy had "significant application" ([55]). Verdins limb five was enlivened, because imprisonment would be more burdensome for him given his mental health ([60]). Limb one was not: there was no link between his conditions and the offending sufficient to reduce his moral culpability, and he was severely drug affected at the time ([61]). He had completed his VCE on remand ([59]). After hearing the victim impact statements, he wrote a letter of apology to the family, which the judge accepted as genuine. The judge found that he had "developed some remorse" ([62]) and that there were reasons for "cautious optimism" about his rehabilitation ([63]).

The guilty plea

KA's plea entitled him to a significant discount. It was not entered at the earliest stage, but because his fitness to stand trial was in question it was treated as entered at a similar stage to AB's, shortly before trial. The plea had important utilitarian value, which was not reduced because DM went to trial anyway ([64]).

Youth

Both offenders' immaturity made them less blameworthy than adults. However, youth and rehabilitation "must yield some ground" to general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment where the offending is this grave ([65]). The judge also had regard to a range of earlier sentences for murders committed by people under 18 ([66], footnote 27).

Parity

The judge said that applying parity here was "not straightforward" ([68]). The three were the same age, with similar backgrounds and criminal histories that differed but "not greatly" ([67]). DM went to trial, although the issues at trial were limited. AB's priors were more serious than KA's. KA had stronger evidence of remorse than AB, and DM had none ([68]). The two key distinguishing factors were, most significantly, the guilty pleas by AB and KA, and DM's slightly lesser role ([69]). KA was given the same head sentence as AB, with a slightly lower non-parole period to reflect his remorse and prospects. DM received the highest sentence. He was not punished for going to trial, but he was not entitled to any of the benefits that come with a guilty plea ([69]).

Conclusion

Youth and disadvantage reduced both offenders' culpability, but the gravity of the murder limited how far they could reduce the sentence. Within the parity framework, the guilty plea was the decisive difference ([65], [69]).

🏛️ Sentences Imposed

• KA: convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months. 1,203 days of pre-sentence detention were declared as time served ([70]).
• DM: convicted of murder and sentenced to 18 years and 6 months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 14 years. 1,203 days of pre-sentence detention were declared as time served ([71]).
• Under s 6AAA, for KA only: but for the guilty plea, the sentence would have been 20 years with a non-parole period of 16 years ([72]).
• For comparison, AB received 17 years with a non-parole period of 13 years ([5]).
• The judgment does not mention any appeal.

🧭 Practical Lessons

• For the public and self-represented readers: A guilty plea, especially with genuine remorse, can make a real difference to a sentence, even for the most serious offences. ([64], [69], [72]).
• For practitioners: In a parity argument, small differences in timing or the number of blows struck are unlikely to separate co-offenders who carried out the same agreed attack ([28]).
• For practitioners: Verdins limb one needs evidence of a real link between the condition and the offending. Limb five (a more burdensome sentence) may still apply without that link ([60]–[61]).
• For practitioners: Evidence of remorse that develops over time, such as a genuine apology, can still matter at sentence and can justify a different non-parole period between co-offenders ([62]–[63], [69]).

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

• Parity means like cases are treated alike, but genuine differences such as a guilty plea, the offender's role and remorse can set co-offenders apart.
• Youth reduces blameworthiness, but its weight decreases as the gravity of the offence increases.
• Going to trial is not punished, but it does not attract the benefits of a plea.

"Same offence, different sentences: parity weighs the plea, the role and the remorse."

This digest is general information about a published judgment, not legal advice. For advice about your own situation, speak to a lawyer, Legal Aid or a community legal centre.