Queensland’s Civil and Administrative Tribunal has not yet decided whether COVID-19 vaccine mandates unlawfully discriminated against Jayden Beale. What it has decided is more revealing. In June 2026, Member Wilson refused the State’s sixth attempt to throw the case out. The State’s argument was not merely that the mandates were justified. It was that a Christian’s own reading of Scripture is not, without more, a “religious belief” the law will protect. That claim deserves close attention. If accepted at trial, it would change how Queensland treats conscience, churches, and the individual believer. If rejected, it would reaffirm a principle Australian courts have stated for eighty years: the State does not get to write the catechism.

Parliament has just handed the Executive a new weapon: a “middle-tier” proscription regime that can ban organisations by regulation, criminalise ordinary proximity to those organisations, and turn immigration decisions into a “might”-based purge—all while quietly switching off procedural fairness at the front end. This isn’t a laser. It’s a net. And the net is designed to catch people who think they’re nowhere near “extremism”.

The introduction of the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026 into the Australian Parliament marks a precipitous descent into legislative authoritarianism. Masquerading as a necessary shield against the scourge of hatred, this omnibus Bill is, in reality, a sword struck at the heart of Australia’s liberal democratic tradition. It represents a fundamental realignment of the relationship between the citizen and the state, substituting the rule of law for the rule of executive suspicion, and replacing the presumption of innocence with a presumption of guilt for those who dare to traverse the increasingly narrow corridors of permissible expression and association.

The image is AI imagining life under the Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026. Behind its feel-good promises of safety and harmony, this Bill’s vague definitions, sweeping powers, and harsh penalties threaten to shatter fundamental freedoms – from free speech and free association to due process and equality before the law. It stretches well beyond targeting neo-Nazis or violent extremists, casting a wide net that could easily ensnare ordinary citizens – activists, journalists, artists, clergy, even members of minority communities – who never imagined they’d be branded “extremists.” Below, we expose how this Bill’s ambiguous language, constitutional infirmities, unchecked executive powers, and dangerous breadth put every Australian’s civil liberties at risk.

This case, Shepherd v The State of South Australia [2024] SAET 2, involves an employee, Mr. Daniel Shepherd, who sought a review of a decision to reject his compensation claim for pericarditis which he claimed was caused by having a third dose of the COVID-19 vaccine. The respondent, the State of South Australia, admitted that the vaccine caused pericarditis but argued that the injection did not arise from employment but from a lawful State Government vaccination directive. The respondent also contended that any liability for any injury is excluded by legislation. The case was heard in the South Australian Employment Tribunal.
FACTS
The case in question is Shepherd v The State of South Australia (in right of the Department for Child Protection) [2024] SAET 2. The applicant, Daniel Shepherd, was a child and youth support worker employed by the Department for Child Protection (DCP). In line with a directive under the Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA), Shepherd was required to have a third dose of the COVID-19 vaccine to continue working.

After receiving this third dose on 24 February 2022, Shepherd experienced severe chest pain which was later diagnosed as post-vaccine pericarditis, an inflammation of the membrane surrounding the heart. As a result, he made a claim for weekly payments of income support and medical expenses which was rejected by the State of South Australia.

The state initially did not accept that the vaccine had caused the injury but later admitted that it had resulted in Shepherd's incapacity for work. However, they continued to defend against his claim on two grounds: 1) that the injury did not arise from employment within the meaning of s 7 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA), but rather from a direction given under the Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA), and 2) if s 7 of the RTW Act was satisfied, s 32A of the EM Act excludes any liability arising from a direction given under the EM Act or any act or omission by the state in relation to its management of COVID-19.

ISSUES

1. Whether the applicant's pericarditis, which occurred following a third dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, arose from his employment or from a lawful State Government vaccination directive.
2. Whether the respondent can avoid liability for any injury caused by the vaccination under Section 32A of the Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) (EM Act).
3. Whether the applicant's employment was a significant contributing cause of his work injury as per Section 7 of the Return to Work Act 2014.

ANALYSIS

Issue: The primary issue in this case was whether the pericarditis suffered by Mr. Shepherd following his third dose of COVID-19 vaccine was an injury arising out of employment, making him eligible for compensation under the Return to Work Act 2014 (RTW Act). Additionally, it was to be determined whether Section 32A of the Emergency Management Act 2004 (EM Act) could exclude any liability for the injury.

Rule: Under Section 7 of the RTW Act, employment must be a significant contributing cause of a work injury, but not necessarily its only or most significant cause. In contrast, Section 32A of the EM Act potentially excludes any liability arising from a direction given under the act or any act or omission of the state in managing the COVID-19 pandemic.

Application: Judge Calligeros ruled that Mr. Shepherd's injury resulted from both the vaccination mandate and his employment with DCP. While it was agreed that he had received the third dose due to a lawful State Government vaccination directive, his employment was still considered a significant contributing cause. This satisfied Section 7 of the RTW Act. As for Section 32A of the EM Act, it did not prohibit Mr. Shepherd's claim as it did not clearly and unambiguously lead to that conclusion. Rejecting his claim would not achieve the objectives of the EM Act.

Conclusion: The court held that Mr. Shepherd's injury arose from both a vaccination mandate and his employment, satisfying Section 7 of the RTW Act and thus making him eligible for compensation. Furthermore, it concluded that Section 32A of the EM Act did not exclude any liability for his injury.

Take Home Lesson: This case highlights that when determining compensation eligibility for injuries resulting from mandatory vaccinations under workplace law in Australia, both the circumstances leading to vaccination and legislative requirements need careful consideration. Employment does not need to be the sole or most significant cause of injury for compensation to be awarded, but a significant contributing factor. Furthermore, legislation that may potentially exclude liability needs to be unambiguous and clear in its intent.

 

Vanderstock v Victoria [2023] HCA 30 (18 October 2023)

Facts:

The case in question is Vanderstock v Victoria [2023] HCA 30, heard by the High Court of Australia. The plaintiffs, Christopher Vanderstock and another party, challenged the validity of section 7(1) of the Zero and Low Emission Vehicle Distance-based Charge Act 2021 (Vic) ("ZLEV Charge Act"). This provision purports to obligate the registered operator of a zero or low emissions vehicle ("ZLEV") to pay a charge for using the ZLEV on "specified roads", which include all roads in Victoria and elsewhere in Australia over which the public has a right to pass. The charge is determined annually at a prescribed rate for each kilometre travelled by the ZLEV on specified roads in a financial year. The plaintiffs argued that this provision is invalid because it imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of section 90 of the Constitution.

The defendant in this case was the State of Victoria, represented by R J Orr KC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria, with S Zeleznikow and M R Salinger. Various Attorneys-General from different states intervened in support of Victoria. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened in support of the plaintiffs.

The question for consideration was whether section 7(1) of the ZLEV Charge Act invalidly imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of s 90 of the Constitution. If so, this would mean that only the Commonwealth Parliament could impose such a charge.

In its judgment, delivered on 18 October 2023, the Court held that section 7(1) does impose a duty of excise and therefore is invalid. The Court ordered that the defendant should pay the costs of proceedings.

Issues:

The issues in this case revolve around the interpretation and application of sections 51(ii) and 90 of the Australian Constitution. These sections concern the taxation powers of the Commonwealth and State governments, respectively.

The first issue is whether a concurrent power to tax (s 51(ii)) equates to a limitation (s 90). The justices argued that these two provisions should not be conflated or interpreted to expand the power in s 51(ii) or the limitation in s 90.

The second issue relates to whether State taxation powers are concurrent with, and independent of, that of the Commonwealth. This question arises from different interpretations of Professor Zines' analysis on the scope of the taxation power in s 51(ii).

The third issue involves assessing whether what is proposed as a "duty of excise" - any tax on goods - alters and affects the structural, political and constitutional balance between State and federal governments.

The fourth issue is whether a tax with any assumed effect on demand for goods is beyond the legislative power of the States.

Finally, there is an issue concerning constitutional facts and their relevance in determining constitutional validity. The argument here revolves around whether it's appropriate for constitutional validity to be decided based on potential economic consequences, particularly without evidence.

All these issues are relevant because they involve significant interpretations of key provisions in the Australian Constitution that shape fiscal relations between different levels of government in Australia. Decisions made on these issues could have significant implications for state autonomy, fiscal federalism, and Australia's broader constitutional framework.

Main Issue: The main issue in the case of Vanderstock v Victoria [2023] HCA 30 was whether section 7(1) of the Zero and Low Emission Vehicle Distance-based Charge Act 2021 (Vic) ("ZLEV Charge Act") is invalid as it imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of section 90 of the Constitution.

Rule: Section 90 of the Australian Constitution gives exclusive power to the Commonwealth Parliament to impose duties of customs and excise. It restricts states from levying taxes on goods that could distort interstate trade, commerce, and market competition.

Application: The High Court examined whether the charge imposed by the Victorian legislation fell within the definition of an excise. The ZLEV Charge Act obliges registered operators of zero or low emissions vehicles ("ZLEV") to pay a charge for their use on specified roads, which includes all roads in Victoria and elsewhere in Australia where public access is granted. This charge is determined annually based on each kilometre travelled by the ZLEV on specified roads in a financial year, making it a debt payable by the registered operator to Victoria.

The court applied past judgments, particularly Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [No 2] (1993) 178 CLR 561 and Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, which held that duties of excise within s 90 are inland taxes on goods. The court had to consider whether a tax imposed at the stage of consumption could be considered an excise, something not decided in those previous cases. The court found that such a tax can indeed be an excise, contradicting Dickenson's Arcade Pty Ltd v Tasmania (1974) 130 CLR 177 and overruling its decision.

Conclusion: The court concluded that section 7(1) of the ZLEV Charge Act is invalid because it imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of section 90 of the Constitution. This decision reinforces the principle that the power to impose duties of customs and excise is exclusive to the Commonwealth Parliament.

Reasoning for Judgement: The court's reasoning was based on the definitions and characterizations of "excise" in previous cases and its application to this particular charge. They noted that a tax on goods imposed at the stage of consumption can indeed be an excise, which led them to overrule a previous decision (Dickenson's Arcade).

Take Home Lesson: This case reaffirms that states cannot enact laws that effectively impose taxes on goods, as this power is reserved exclusively for the Commonwealth Parliament under section 90 of the Constitution. It also broadens the definition of 'excise' to include charges imposed at the point of consumption, adding another layer of complexity to constitutional tax law. This means lawmakers must be careful when drafting legislation involving charges or taxes on goods, even when these are not traditional production or sales taxes.

Issue: Whether the Magistrate's Court had jurisdiction to vary and extend the final family violence intervention order (FVIO) without an application or order for extension before the expiry date, and whether the relief in the nature of certiorari should be declined despite jurisdictional error.

Rule: The relevant law in this matter is the Family Violence Protection Act 2018 (Vic), Part 4 and the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic), Order 56. The law provides that a FVIO expires 12 months after it is made, unless extended by the court. An application for extension must be made before the expiry date of the FVIO. If no application or order for extension is made before the expiry date, the FVIO will expire.

Application: In this case, DDD consented to a final FVIO protecting his wife EEE and child for twelve months without admissions. Two months later, on EEE's ex parte application, the court made an interim order varying the final FVIO to a "no contact" order, which was expressed to "last until final order". The matter was adjourned for the final hearing of the variation application. Due to delays resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the final hearing was not reached for another fourteen months, which is four months after the expiry date of the final FVIO.

DDD did not apply for or order any extension of the final FVIO at the ex parte application or at any other time prior to the expiry date. Over DDD's objection as to jurisdiction, the magistrate made final orders varying and extending the final FVIO for two years, despite the passing of the expiry date. The magistrate ruled that the final FVIO was still extant because the earlier application for variation and adjournment carried with it an implicit extension of the final FVIO.

DDD sought relief in the nature of certiorari to quash the magistrate's final orders, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to vary and extend the final FVIO without an application or order for extension before the expiry date.

The court found that the magistrate's final orders were made without jurisdiction, as there was no application or order for extension before the expiry date of the final FVIO. The court also considered whether relief in the nature of certiorari should be declined despite jurisdictional error. Ultimately, the court granted an extension of time to commence proceedings and quashed the magistrate's final orders. Costs were ordered in favour of DDD and against EEE, with no costs awarded for or against the Magistrates' Court or contradictor. An indemnity certificate was granted to EEE.

Conclusion: The court found that the Magistrate's Court did not have jurisdiction to vary and extend the final FVIO without an application or order for extension before the expiry date. The court granted relief in the nature of certiorari, quashing the magistrate's final orders. The court also granted an extension of time to commence proceedings and awarded costs in favour of DDD and against EEE, with no costs awarded for or against the Magistrates' Court or contradictor.

Issue: The issue in this case is whether the defendant, Nine Network, is liable for defamation arising from comments made on its Facebook page about the plaintiff, Osman Faruqi, and if the plaintiff is entitled to an extension of time to bring their claim and whether the defendant’s defences are tenable.

Rule: The rules that apply in this case are the defamation law, particularly the provisions of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).
The main section of legislation considered in this defamation matter is section 23C of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), which deals with the extension of limitation periods in defamation proceedings. Additionally, section 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) was also discussed, which sets out the defences available in defamation proceedings, such as the defences of truth, honest opinion and privilege.

Application: The plaintiff in this case filed a claim against the defendant, alleging that comments on the defendant’s Facebook page were defamatory towards him. The defendant denied that the comments were defamatory and raised defences of contextual truth, honest opinion, and qualified privilege.

Regarding the limitation issue, the court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to an extension of time to bring their claims with respect to the first broadcast, downloads of the segment, and comments before February 18, 2021. The plaintiff was also granted an extension of time to bring their claims with respect to downloads of the segment and comments after July 2021, insofar as the comments were first posted prior to February 18, 2021. The court held that the plaintiff should be granted an extension of time until February 22, 2022, in respect of the publications referred to above.

In relation to the strike-out application, the court found that the defences advanced by the defendants are tenable, and accordingly, the strike-out application was dismissed. The court allowed the defendants to file and serve their proposed amended defence.

Conclusion: The court found that the defendant was not liable for defamation arising from comments made on its Facebook page. The court also granted an extension of time to the plaintiff to bring their claims and held that the defendant’s defences were tenable.

Overall, the court applied the relevant law to the facts of the case to determine the outcome. The plaintiff was able to receive an extension of time, and the defendant was able to rely on their defences.
Relevant Cases Considered:
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
Defteros v Google LLC [2021] VSCA 48
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104