EMPLOYEES SEEKS THE COURT TO COMPEL EMPLOYER TO BE BOUND WITH THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ENTITLING THEM TO THE PRIVATE USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE FOUND IN THE NOW-EXPIRED AGREEMENT
This case involves the plaintiffs alleging that the department is still bound by the now-expired agreement entitling them to private use of a motor vehicle which the department denies them.
Facts:
Christine Rudge and William Wynn (the plaintiffs) have each brought proceedings against the Crown (the defendant) claiming relief concerning their entitlements as employees. In substance, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant is bound, as long as they occupy their current positions, to provide them with certain conditions of employment which had their origin in the now-expired Motor Vehicle Repair Industry Council, Public Service Agreement 1994 (the Enterprise Agreement). The most significant of those conditions is the provision of a motor vehicle for their private use, the costs associated with which were met by the defendant.
The defendant, opposed the plaintiffs’ claims for relief, maintaining that it was not contractually bound by an assurance it gave to the plaintiffs to that effect in 2007 as part of the settlement of proceedings in the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC). He contended that the plaintiffs’ contracts of employment were not, and did not become, unfair.
Issue: Is the defendant still bound by the to provide the plaintiffs with the conditions of employment found in the now-expired agreement as long as the plaintiffs occupy their current positions?
Held:
The language of the Department’s offer in 2007 connotes an intention to create legal relations, at least in so far as it purports to give “assurances” to the affected employees. It is couched in precise language as to what is to happen in particular events, including, if the Department is restructured (which gave rise to the words, “or its successor”) or if one of the affected employees ceases to occupy the substantive position of inspector. It is, in the court’s view, highly significant that the offer lists the affected employees by name and position and confirms that the assurances are made to each of them. Further, the letter adopts wording which is commonly used in legally binding documents to prescribe the length of time during which the assurance will be binding (“while ever the above-named officers occupy Inspector positions at grades equivalent to their current substantive positions within the [Authority] or the proposed Motor Industry Branch or its successor”).
Although the word “assurance” might, in other circumstances, amount to a representation rather than a promise, the court is satisfied that, in this context, it was used to connote a promise. The Department was in a position to make good the assurances, since it was, as employer, party to the contract of employment. The word assurance implied that the recipient was entitled to rely on it and that it was a promise that the giver of the assurance would be bound to fulfil. It is important that the offer said that the Department “will maintain” certain conditions of employment for a defined period (commencing “while ever”).
The court is satisfied that there was an agreement between each of the five affected employees on the one hand and the Department on the other that, if the PSA withdrew the award proceedings, the Department would continue to provide the benefits of the Enterprise Agreement which fell within the named categories to each of them as long as they remained in their substantive positions as safety inspectors. The identity of the parties was clear as were the terms. there was an intention on the part of the affected employees and the Department to create legal relations which would be enforceable at law by each of the affected employees (and, if need be, the Department). The Department’s promises were supported by valuable consideration.
Conclusion: The Department is bound to provide the employee with the private use of motor vehicles.
