Latest Posts RSSThu, 08 Oct 2026 23:47:55 GMTIn In the matter of (ACN 004 593 953) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] VSC 661, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Steffensen AsJ, Commercial Court, Corporations List) dealt with an application by the liquidators of a failed seating manufacturer. They sought the Court's retrospective approval to enter into a funding agreement with the Commonwealth and two costs agreements with their lawyers. Each agreement could run for more than three months, so under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) each needed approval from creditors or the Court. The creditors' vote had failed, and the only "no" votes came from related parties or from creditors who had given the company's director their proxy. The result was that approval was granted, retrospectively, in the terms sought ([33], [43]–[44]). The important point is that the Court looks at whether the agreement serves the liquidation and the creditors, gives real weight to the liquidators' commercial judgment, and will not deprive creditors of a potential benefit just because the liquidators were slow to apply ([30], [32], [40]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: When a company collapses, the people who ran it can sometimes use creditor votes to slow down an investigation into their own conduct. This decision shows how a court-approval route under s 477(2B) operates as a check on that, and how the Court assesses funding deals, "no win, uplift" legal costs and delay.At a glanceCourt: Supreme Court of Victoria, Commercial Court (Corporations List), Associate Justice, at first instanceArea of law: Corporate insolvency; liquidators' powers; litigation fundingDecision type: Application for court approval under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (alternatively s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule)Outcome: Retrospective approval granted for the Funding Agreement (as amended) and both Costs AgreementsStandard applied: The Court does not "rubber stamp", but it will not interfere with a... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:47:55 GMTIn iMech Solutions Pty Ltd v Liangis Investments Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 1244, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Emmett J, sitting as duty judge) dealt with an urgent application by a hotel developer. The developer wanted to freeze money that a building contractor had just collected from the developer's bank under a garnishee order. The money came from a security of payment adjudication. The result was that a short-term freezing order was made, restraining the contractor from disposing of or dealing with assets up to $278,987.91, with directions for a contested hearing within days ([32]). The important point is that the "pay now, argue later" policy of security of payment laws carries great weight, but it does not completely shut the door on interim protection. Here the developer showed an arguable (though not strong) case that the garnishee order was an abuse of process, there was some evidence of a risk of insolvency, and the order was kept short ([21], [25], [28], [31]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Security of payment laws are designed to get cash to contractors quickly, with disputes resolved later. This ex tempore decision shows the narrow circumstances in which a court may still preserve that money briefly: a pending stay application, unanswered correspondence, non-disclosure to the court, and solvency concerns all played a part. It also shows the limits on using one court to protect proceedings in another.At a glanceCourt: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, duty judge, ex tempore (revised)Area of law: Civil procedure (freezing orders); building and construction security of payment; enforcement of judgmentsDecision type: Urgent interlocutory application, treated as akin to ex parteOutcome: Freezing order for a short period, up to $278,987.91, plus directions for a contested hearingStandard applied: Prima facie (arguable) case; danger that a prospective judgment will be frustrated; balance of convenien... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:45:52 GMTIn Anstee Earthmoving Pty Ltd v City of Busselton [2026] WASC 439, the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Whitby J) dealt with a company's appeal against a $182,000 fine imposed by a magistrate. The company had pleaded guilty to using rural land without planning approval, by storing large stockpiles of building waste, some of which contained asbestos. The result was that leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the company was resentenced to a fine of $90,000 (Orders 1–5; [66]–[68]). The important point is that, even with a maximum penalty of $1 million for a company and a strong emphasis on deterrence, a fine must reflect where the offending sits on the scale. Offending involving "at its highest … a lack of care", with an early plea, no priors and remediation, was not in the same league as flagrant, long-running breaches ([60], [66]). The Court also rejected a "mathematical" approach of scaling up old fines to match today's higher maximum ([64]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Planning offences are prosecuted by local councils across Australia, and businesses are often the defendants. This case shows how appeal courts test a fine for "manifest excess": against the maximum, comparable cases, the seriousness of the offence and the offender's circumstances. It also shows why comparable cases are a guide, not a formula.At a glanceCourt: Supreme Court of Western Australia, single judge, on appeal from the Magistrates Court (Busselton)Area of law: Sentencing; planning and development offences; criminal appealsDecision type: Appeal against sentence (fine) after a plea of guilty, with leave requiredOutcome: Leave granted; appeal allowed; the $182,000 fine set aside and replaced with a $90,000 fine; the magistrate's $3,000 costs order left in placeStandard applied: Manifest excess, meaning the sentence must be "unreasonable or plainly unjust" so that error is implied ([37]–[40])Costs: The parties are to confer about the c... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:44:30 GMTIn The King v Bechaud [2026] HCA 36, the High Court of Australia (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) dealt with a narrow but practical question about Victorian jury trials: when must jurors take the "separation oath" that lets them go home overnight once deliberations have begun? A majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal held that taking it on day one, rather than just before the first separation, made the trial miscarry. The High Court unanimously disagreed. The Crown's appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal's orders were set aside, and the respondent's appeal against his conviction was dismissed (Orders 1–2; [4], [36]). The important point is that s 50 of the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) requires only that each juror has taken the oath before separation is allowed. It says nothing about when, and an oath, once taken, continues to bind ([15], [18], [25], [29]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Jurors routinely go home overnight during deliberations. A trial is not derailed simply because the separation oath was administered early, but reminding jurors of it before each separation is still good practice, and in some circumstances failing to do so could be an error ([29]).At a glanceCourt: High Court of Australia (Full Court of five), on appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of VictoriaArea of law: Criminal procedure; jury trials; statutory interpretationDecision type: Crown appeal against a Court of Appeal decision quashing a conviction and ordering a retrialOutcome: Appeal allowed; the Court of Appeal's orders 2 to 6 were set aside and the appeal against conviction was dismissed, so the conviction standsStandard applied: Whether there was an error or irregularity amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice; whether the trial judge's discretion miscarried in the House v The King sense ([4], [33]–[35])Costs: The judgment makes no costs order (criminal appeal)🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe respond... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:41:18 GMTQueensland’s Civil and Administrative Tribunal has not yet decided whether COVID-19 vaccine mandates unlawfully discriminated against Jayden Beale. What it has decided is more revealing. In June 2026, Member Wilson refused the State’s sixth attempt to throw the case out. The State’s argument was not merely that the mandates were justified. It was that a Christian’s own reading of Scripture is not, without more, a “religious belief” the law will protect.That claim deserves close attention. If accepted at trial, it would change how Queensland treats conscience, churches, and the individual believer. If rejected, it would reaffirm a principle Australian courts have stated for eighty years: the State does not get to write the catechism. The facts in shortBeale, a Brisbane legal professional employed by the State, refused the 2021–22 public-health directions requiring COVID-19 vaccination of Queenslanders aged 16 and over. He says the refusal was religious. He relies on 1 Corinthians 6:19–20 — the body as a temple of the Holy Spirit — and on a conviction that he must not introduce into his body products developed or tested using cells derived from aborted fetuses. He says he has never been vaccinated for that reason. He first complained to the Queensland Human Rights Commission in December 2022. The matter is now Beale v State of Queensland (QCAT ADL014-23), brought under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and piggybacked onto s 59 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The State has applied six times to have the proceeding struck out. The latest application, heard on 30 April 2026 and dismissed on 17 June 2026, argued that Beale’s position was a “subjective interpretation” of the Bible and therefore not protected religious belief unless it tracked an official church “code of conduct.” Member Wilson declined to accept that as a basis for summary dismissal and sent the case toward trial. An earlier judicial-review challenge to the directions... Read more

]]>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 08:45:02 GMTAustralia’s New “Hate & Extremism” Law Isn’t Coming For Them… It’s Coming For YouParliament has just handed the Executive a new weapon: a “middle-tier” proscription regime that can ban organisations by regulation, criminalise ordinary proximity to those organisations, and turn immigration decisions into a “might”-based purge—all while quietly switching off procedural fairness at the front end.This isn’t a laser. It’s a net. And the net is designed to catch people who think they’re nowhere near “extremism”.The Big Pivot: From “terror” to “hate”—and from “proof” to “risk”1) “Prohibited hate groups” can be created by regulation (executive pen, not a court order)An organisation becomes a “prohibited hate group” if it’s specified in regulations—a classic “list first, litigate later” architecture.The “advocacy” test is where this turns explosive: it captures not just urging violence, but “praise” of a hate crime where there is an “unacceptable risk” that the praise might lead someone else to act.That’s a triple-elastic concept stack: praise + unacceptable risk + might lead. In law, elastic language doesn’t “protect the community”—it protects discretion.2) The listing threshold is “reasonably necessary” to protect the community—another rubber phraseThe final Act keeps the threshold that banning must be “reasonably necessary to protect the Australian community”.What is “harm”? What is “necessary”? Who decides what’s “reasonable”? The Minister does—then the courts are left cleaning up after the fact (if you can even get standing, evidence, and time).The “No Hearing” Problem: Natural justice is deliberately switched offThe final Act retains the ouster of procedural fairness for listing decisions—word-for-word.And the Act itself is blunt: the Minister is not required to observe any rules of natural justice in these listing decisions.So if your organisation is listed:you may not get notice beforehand,you may not get a meaningful chance to respond,and the legal “battle” begi... Read more

]]>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 23:58:46 GMTThe Erosion of Liberty: A Forensic and Constitutional Critique of the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026Executive Summary: The Architecture of the Security StateThe introduction of the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026 into the Australian Parliament marks a precipitous descent into legislative authoritarianism. Masquerading as a necessary shield against the scourge of hatred, this omnibus Bill is, in reality, a sword struck at the heart of Australia’s liberal democratic tradition. It represents a fundamental realignment of the relationship between the citizen and the state, substituting the rule of law for the rule of executive suspicion, and replacing the presumption of innocence with a presumption of guilt for those who dare to traverse the increasingly narrow corridors of permissible expression and association.This report, authored from the perspective of a constitutional and human rights legal expert, provides an exhaustive, hard-hitting analysis of the Bill. It exposes the constitutional fragilities, the draconian overreach, and the insidious mechanisms by which this legislation seeks to criminalise ideology, weaponise migration law, and automate injustice. The analysis draws upon a comprehensive review of the Bill’s text 1, established High Court precedents including Williams v Commonwealth 2 and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation 4, and international human rights frameworks under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5The Bill is not merely a collection of amendments; it is a coherent architecture of oppression. It creates a new class of "thought crimes" by criminalising the dissemination of "ideas of superiority" 1, a concept so vague as to capture religious doctrine, political philosophy, and historical debate. It resurrects the discredited doctrine of "guilt by association" in migration law, enacting a statutory definition of "association" that captures a single meeting or communica... Read more

]]>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 12:08:27 GMTThe Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026 – A Draconian Assault on Civil LibertiesIn the name of fighting hate, the government is poised to unleash a law that could criminalize words, thoughts and associations on an unprecedented scale. The innocuously titled Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026 is an authoritarian sledgehammer cloaked in the language of tolerance. Behind its feel-good promises of safety and harmony, this Bill’s vague definitions, sweeping powers, and harsh penalties threaten to shatter fundamental freedoms – from free speech and free association to due process and equality before the law. It stretches well beyond targeting neo-Nazis or violent extremists, casting a wide net that could easily ensnare ordinary citizens – activists, journalists, artists, clergy, even members of minority communities – who never imagined they’d be branded “extremists.” Below, we expose how this Bill’s ambiguous language, constitutional infirmities, unchecked executive powers, and dangerous breadth put every Australian’s civil liberties at risk.Ambiguous Language – A Recipe for Misinterpretation and AbuseThe Bill is riddled with vague and overbroad terms that give authorities frightening latitude to interpret dissent or unpopular opinions as “hate” or “extremism.” Key definitions are so elastic that almost any controversial group or passionate speech could be stretched to fit. For example:• “Prohibited Hate Group” – Whatever the Government Says It Is: The Bill doesn’t precisely define what ideology or conduct makes a group “hateful.” Instead, a “prohibited hate group” is simply “an organisation that is specified by the regulations” – in other words, any group the government chooses to blacklist[1]. There are no clear limits: today a neo-Nazi cell, tomorrow a radical climate protest network or an outspoken religious sect could wear the “hate group” label if those in power decide so. This open-ended definition practically beg... Read more

]]>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 10:03:29 GMTASF17 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] HCA 19 (10 May 2024) Intro:- This is an appeal from the Federal Court of Australia Facts:- The appellant, ASF17, is a citizen of Iran. He arrived in Australia as an unlawful non-citizen at the age of 27 in 2013. Except for a short period during which he held a bridging visa between 2013 and 2014, he has been held in immigration detention continuously since his arrival. While in immigration detention, ASF17 in 2015 made an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa ("SHEV"). The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in 2017. An application for judicial review of the decision of the delegate was dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in 2017[4] in a decision which was upheld on appeal to the Federal Court of Australia in 2018. The final determination of his application for a SHEV which occurred upon the dismissal of the appeal in 2018 engaged the duty imposed on officers of the Department of Home Affairs ("the Department") by s 198(6) of the Act to remove ASF17 from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable. Unlike the plaintiff in NZYQ, ASF17 has never formally requested to be removed from Australia so as to engage the other duty to remove imposed on officers of the Department by s 198(1) of the Act. For the purpose of facilitating removal of ASF17 from Australia, officers of the Department conducted regular interviews with him from 2018. Throughout those interviews, he consistently told officers that he would not voluntarily return to Iran. He consistently refused to sign a request for removal or to engage with Iranian authorities in planning for his removal. He repeatedly told officers that he would agree to be sent to any country other than Iran. However, he did not suggest that there was any country to which he might be removed other than Iran. Iranian citizens cannot enter Iran from Australia without a travel document issued by Iranian authorities and ... Read more

]]>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 08:09:27 GMTMiller v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 13 (17 April 2024) Intro:- This is an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia Facts:- Mr Miller is a Fijian national whose Resident Return (Subclass 155) visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Migration Act"). A delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs ("the Minister") decided under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act not to revoke that original decision on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied in terms of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) that there was "another reason why the original decision should be revoked". ... Calculating the period so fixed by s 500(6B) of the Migration Act in accordance with s 36 of Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the last day for Mr Miller to make an application to the Tribunal for review of the decision of the delegate was 25 March 2021. Mr Miller's migration agent made an application to the Tribunal for review of the decision of the delegate on 24 March 2021. Apparently because the migration agent mistook the form approved by the President of the Tribunal to be used for making such an application, the application made by the migration agent contained no statement of the reasons for the application. The Tribunal held a directions hearing on 1 April 2021 at which the Tribunal requested that Mr Miller provide reasons for the application. In response to that request, Mr Miller's solicitors emailed the Tribunal on 9 April 2021. Under the heading "Why do you claim the decision is wrong?", the email stated, "[t]he Minister erred in concluding that there is not another reason why the original decision to cancel the applicant's Resident Return (Subclass 155) visa should be revoked". There is no dispute that this statement would have been sufficient to comply with s 29(1)(c) of the AAT Act had it been contained in the application made on 24 March 2021. Tribunal and decision of t... Read more

]]>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 08:01:58 GMT