Latest Posts RSSThu, 29 Oct 2026 22:55:35 GMTIn Lill v Westbourne Grammar School [2026] FedCFamC2G 2120, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Judge Blake) dismissed a general protections claim by a senior school teacher whose employment ended after about 28 years. She injured her wrist at work in 2021, worked with adjusted duties for more than three and a half years, and was dismissed in December 2024. The Court accepted she had a physical disability, but found the school dismissed her because she could not meet the inherent requirements of her position, not because of the disability. The Court also ruled that the "inherent requirements" exception in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) does not carry over the "reasonable adjustments" test in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: A worker who says they were dismissed because of a disability can sue under the Fair Work Act or under discrimination law. On this Court's reading, an employer relying on the Fair Work Act exception does not have to show it considered reasonable adjustments. The judge acknowledged the inconsistency between the two Acts and said it is perhaps a matter warranting legislative review ([99]).At a glanceCourt and level: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), General Federal Law (single judge, first instance)Area of law: Employment law; general protections (adverse action) under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)Decision type: Final judgment after a three-day trial (3–5 June 2026)Outcome: Application dismissed ([123])Burden: The employer carried the "reverse onus" of proving its reasons ([115])Costs: Not dealt with in the published reasons🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe teacher began at the school in 1996. At the relevant time she was a full-time senior school teacher of Year 11 and 12 classes, including Legal Studies ([4], [7]).In March 2021 she injured her left wrist at school. She is left-handed. The wrist was strained again in 202... Read more

]]>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 22:55:35 GMTA law professor at Adelaide University has started proceedings against the university in the Federal Court of Australia. She says the case is about her workplace rights to academic freedom and free speech. Nothing in her claim has been tested or proven, and the university has not yet filed a defence or had its say in court. This post explains what has been claimed, what the university has said, and the legal rules the Court is likely to apply, including the High Court's leading academic freedom decision, Ridd v James Cook University [2021] HCA 32.Why it matters: Australian universities must have policies that protect academic freedom, and many enterprise agreements protect it too. Cases that test where those protections stop are rare. The answer matters to every academic who speaks publicly, and to every university that has to deal with complaints about what its staff say.At a glanceWho: Dr Joanna Howe, a professor in Adelaide University's law school, and the university. Law360 reports that some senior staff are also named.Where: The Federal Court of Australia. She says she filed on 26 October 2026.What she alleges: That the university breached her workplace rights to academic freedom and free speech. Media reports say the claim relies on the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and her employment contract.The university's position: Before the filing, the university said it was taking the matter "very seriously" but had not been given any court documents and could not comment.Status: No hearing has happened, and no facts have been found. The court file number, pleadings and the orders she is seeking were not public when this post was written.📣 What has been claimedEverything in this section is Dr Howe's account. None of it has been proven, and the university has not yet answered it in court.In a post on X on 26 October 2026, she said she had filed proceedings against the university in the Federal Court that day, for breaching her workplace rights to academic freedom and free sp... Read more

]]>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 21:14:03 GMTIn Lamont v The Royal Women's Hospital (No 4) [2026] VSC 687, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Judd J, Common Law Division, Institutional Liability List) decided who should pay for a last-minute application to stop the Court delivering its judgment in a forced adoption negligence claim. The plaintiff's solicitors had asked the Court to hold off judgment while they sought four historical documents and a reopened trial. The Court refused, and in this ruling ordered the plaintiff's solicitors personally to pay both defendants' costs of it, on an indemnity basis. The important point is that pressing an application built on documents the Court had already refused, and which the solicitors had earlier chosen not to pursue, was found to be an abuse of process and a breach of the solicitors' duty to the Court. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Personal costs orders against lawyers are exceptional, but this ruling shows when one will be made. A hopeless application is not enough on its own. What tipped the balance was re-running a point the Court had already decided, after a deliberate decision not to pursue the documents at trial ([48]–[49], [53]).At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Common Law Division, Institutional Liability List (single judge, first instance)Area of law: Costs; solicitors' duties to the court; civil procedure (reopening a case before judgment)Decision type: Ruling on an application for costs against a party's solicitors (a non-party costs order)Outcome: The plaintiff's solicitors must pay both defendants' costs of the application to defer judgment ([51])Basis of costs: Indemnity basis ([53])Standard applied: A discretionary power to award costs against a non-party, used only in exceptional cases ([16])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe plaintiff brought a negligence claim alleging that she had been coerced or forced to give up her baby for adoption. Against the second defendant, her case centred on an assert... Read more

]]>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 22:15:27 GMTIn DPP v DM & KA [2026] VSC 686, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Fox J, Criminal Division) sentenced two young men for the murder of a 14-year-old boy in June 2023, when all three offenders were 17. DM was found guilty by a jury. KA pleaded guilty. A third offender, AB, had already been sentenced by another judge. The result was that KA received 17 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months, and DM received 18 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 14 years. The important point is how a court keeps co-offenders' sentences consistent (the parity principle) while still giving real weight to youth, disadvantaged backgrounds, mental health, remorse and a guilty plea. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: The case shows how youth, the Bugmy and Verdins principles, a guilty plea and parity with an earlier sentence all fit together when the offence is as serious as murder. ([65], [69]).At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Criminal Division (sentencing at first instance)Area of law: Criminal law; sentencing of young offenders for murderDecision type: Sentencing remarks after a jury verdict (DM) and a plea of guilty (KA)Outcome: KA, 17 years with a 12 years 6 months non-parole period; DM, 18 years 6 months with a 14-year non-parole period; 1,203 days of pre-sentence detention declared for each ([70]–[71])Key principles: parity with co-offender AB; youth; Bugmy; Verdins; the guilty plea discount; current sentencing practices ([42], [60], [64]–[69])Plea declaration for KA: but for the plea, 20 years with a 16-year non-parole period ([72])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundBoth offenders were convicted of murder, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment ([1]–[2]). Because both were under 18 at the time, the standard sentence provisions did not apply, but the Court still had to have regard to the specified standard non-parole period (footnote 2).The victim was a 14-year-old boy who was walk... Read more

]]>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 22:59:49 GMTIn Solomon v Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Limited [2026] NSWSC 1301, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Parker J, Equity Division, Commercial List) dealt with a customer's application for discovery (court-ordered disclosure of documents) in her claim against her bank over $6.2 million lost in a fake term deposit scam. The result was that the judge refused two disputed categories of internal bank documents in their current form, told the bank to reconsider its denials, and held that the customer must first amend her pleading to say what the bank, as an institution, should have done. The important point is that a negligence claim against a bank must identify specific, forward-looking safeguards. A list of questions that, in hindsight, might have exposed one particular scam is not enough. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: This is an interlocutory ruling (a decision made along the way, before trial) about pleadings and discovery. The Court made no finding that the bank was negligent or liable, and the customer's allegations have not been tested. What the case does show is how a court expects a bank-scam claim to be framed before the bank has to open its internal files ([79]–[80]).At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Commercial List (first instance)Area of law: Civil procedure (discovery and pleadings); negligence and contract claims against a bankDecision type: Interlocutory ruling on a notice of motion for discoveryOutcome: Disputed Categories 1 and 1A not permitted in their present form; the bank to reconsider its pleaded denials; the customer to file a further amended pleading; interrogatories ordered; the discovery motion stood over ([64], [80], [82]–[86])Standard applied: Whether the documents sought are relevant to the issues as pleaded, and whether the categories are clear enough to comply with ([47], [50]–[58])Costs: Not dealt with in the judgment🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe plaintif... Read more

]]>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 23:00:54 GMTIn MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd v Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc [2026] HCA 35, the High Court of Australia (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) decided whether the approval of a 22-year extension of the Mount Pleasant coal mine in the Hunter Valley was valid. The result was that the approval was invalid, by a 3:2 majority. The important point is that the planning law required the consent authority to consider conditions to minimise all of the project's greenhouse gas emissions, including the downstream "Scope 3" emissions from burning the exported coal, and it never did. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: This is a judicial review decision, not a ruling on whether coal mines should be approved. The Court did not say that conditions on Scope 3 emissions must be imposed. It held that a decision maker who must consider something has to actually turn its mind to it, and that putting 98 per cent of a project's emissions to one side is not doing that ([80], [202]).At a glanceCourt and level: High Court of Australia (Full Court), on appeal from the NSW Court of AppealArea of law: Administrative law; environmental and planning law (NSW)Decision type: Appeal in judicial review proceedingsOutcome: Appeal dismissed 3:2 (Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ; Gageler CJ and Jagot J dissenting); the consent was invalidStandard of review: Jurisdictional error, including materiality, not merits review ([264])Costs: Appeal dismissed with costs (Order 2)🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe mine owner, MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd ("MACH"), applied to extend the life of the Mount Pleasant open cut mine by 22 years, to 22 December 2048, allowing about 406 million more tonnes of coal to be extracted ([2], [73]). As State significant development, the application was decided by the Independent Planning Commission of NSW ("the Commission") ([3]).Scope 1 and 2 emissions (from the mine's own operations and the e... Read more

]]>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 23:34:07 GMTIn In the matter of (ACN 004 593 953) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] VSC 661, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Steffensen AsJ, Commercial Court, Corporations List) dealt with an application by the liquidators of a failed seating manufacturer. They sought the Court's retrospective approval to enter into a funding agreement with the Commonwealth and two costs agreements with their lawyers. Each agreement could run for more than three months, so under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) each needed approval from creditors or the Court. The creditors' vote had failed, and the only "no" votes came from related parties or from creditors who had given the company's director their proxy. The result was that approval was granted, retrospectively, in the terms sought ([33], [43]–[44]). The important point is that the Court looks at whether the agreement serves the liquidation and the creditors, gives real weight to the liquidators' commercial judgment, and will not deprive creditors of a potential benefit just because the liquidators were slow to apply ([30], [32], [40]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: When a company collapses, the people who ran it can sometimes use creditor votes to slow down an investigation into their own conduct. This decision shows how a court-approval route under s 477(2B) operates as a check on that, and how the Court assesses funding deals, "no win, uplift" legal costs and delay.At a glanceCourt: Supreme Court of Victoria, Commercial Court (Corporations List), Associate Justice, at first instanceArea of law: Corporate insolvency; liquidators' powers; litigation fundingDecision type: Application for court approval under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (alternatively s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule)Outcome: Retrospective approval granted for the Funding Agreement (as amended) and both Costs AgreementsStandard applied: The Court does not "rubber stamp", but it will not interfere with a... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:47:55 GMTIn iMech Solutions Pty Ltd v Liangis Investments Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 1244, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Emmett J, sitting as duty judge) dealt with an urgent application by a hotel developer. The developer wanted to freeze money that a building contractor had just collected from the developer's bank under a garnishee order. The money came from a security of payment adjudication. The result was that a short-term freezing order was made, restraining the contractor from disposing of or dealing with assets up to $278,987.91, with directions for a contested hearing within days ([32]). The important point is that the "pay now, argue later" policy of security of payment laws carries great weight, but it does not completely shut the door on interim protection. Here the developer showed an arguable (though not strong) case that the garnishee order was an abuse of process, there was some evidence of a risk of insolvency, and the order was kept short ([21], [25], [28], [31]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Security of payment laws are designed to get cash to contractors quickly, with disputes resolved later. This ex tempore decision shows the narrow circumstances in which a court may still preserve that money briefly: a pending stay application, unanswered correspondence, non-disclosure to the court, and solvency concerns all played a part. It also shows the limits on using one court to protect proceedings in another.At a glanceCourt: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, duty judge, ex tempore (revised)Area of law: Civil procedure (freezing orders); building and construction security of payment; enforcement of judgmentsDecision type: Urgent interlocutory application, treated as akin to ex parteOutcome: Freezing order for a short period, up to $278,987.91, plus directions for a contested hearingStandard applied: Prima facie (arguable) case; danger that a prospective judgment will be frustrated; balance of convenien... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:45:52 GMTIn Anstee Earthmoving Pty Ltd v City of Busselton [2026] WASC 439, the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Whitby J) dealt with a company's appeal against a $182,000 fine imposed by a magistrate. The company had pleaded guilty to using rural land without planning approval, by storing large stockpiles of building waste, some of which contained asbestos. The result was that leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the company was resentenced to a fine of $90,000 (Orders 1–5; [66]–[68]). The important point is that, even with a maximum penalty of $1 million for a company and a strong emphasis on deterrence, a fine must reflect where the offending sits on the scale. Offending involving "at its highest … a lack of care", with an early plea, no priors and remediation, was not in the same league as flagrant, long-running breaches ([60], [66]). The Court also rejected a "mathematical" approach of scaling up old fines to match today's higher maximum ([64]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Planning offences are prosecuted by local councils across Australia, and businesses are often the defendants. This case shows how appeal courts test a fine for "manifest excess": against the maximum, comparable cases, the seriousness of the offence and the offender's circumstances. It also shows why comparable cases are a guide, not a formula.At a glanceCourt: Supreme Court of Western Australia, single judge, on appeal from the Magistrates Court (Busselton)Area of law: Sentencing; planning and development offences; criminal appealsDecision type: Appeal against sentence (fine) after a plea of guilty, with leave requiredOutcome: Leave granted; appeal allowed; the $182,000 fine set aside and replaced with a $90,000 fine; the magistrate's $3,000 costs order left in placeStandard applied: Manifest excess, meaning the sentence must be "unreasonable or plainly unjust" so that error is implied ([37]–[40])Costs: The parties are to confer about the c... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:44:30 GMTIn The King v Bechaud [2026] HCA 36, the High Court of Australia (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) dealt with a narrow but practical question about Victorian jury trials: when must jurors take the "separation oath" that lets them go home overnight once deliberations have begun? A majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal held that taking it on day one, rather than just before the first separation, made the trial miscarry. The High Court unanimously disagreed. The Crown's appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal's orders were set aside, and the respondent's appeal against his conviction was dismissed (Orders 1–2; [4], [36]). The important point is that s 50 of the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) requires only that each juror has taken the oath before separation is allowed. It says nothing about when, and an oath, once taken, continues to bind ([15], [18], [25], [29]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Jurors routinely go home overnight during deliberations. A trial is not derailed simply because the separation oath was administered early, but reminding jurors of it before each separation is still good practice, and in some circumstances failing to do so could be an error ([29]).At a glanceCourt: High Court of Australia (Full Court of five), on appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of VictoriaArea of law: Criminal procedure; jury trials; statutory interpretationDecision type: Crown appeal against a Court of Appeal decision quashing a conviction and ordering a retrialOutcome: Appeal allowed; the Court of Appeal's orders 2 to 6 were set aside and the appeal against conviction was dismissed, so the conviction standsStandard applied: Whether there was an error or irregularity amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice; whether the trial judge's discretion miscarried in the House v The King sense ([4], [33]–[35])Costs: The judgment makes no costs order (criminal appeal)🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe respond... Read more

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