<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Latest Posts RSS</title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/m/posts/rss/public]]></link><atom:link href="https://aisles.com.au/m/posts/rss/public" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><description>Latest Posts RSS</description><lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:11:21 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title><![CDATA[Hotel's ATM settlements and beer rebates diverted to a family company: manager ordered to repay $1.18 million]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=790]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=790]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Gratory Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v Pastrello (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1485, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Sirtes J) gave judgment after a five-day trial of a company's claims against the former manager of its hotel and his family company over hotel income paid into the family company's bank account. The Court found that the manager, Mr Robert Pastrello, dishonestly caused ATM settlements and beer rebates owed to the company to be paid to his family company, and gave judgment for about $1.18 million. Most of the company's separate claims about missing cash failed. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: This is a final decision after a trial, not an interlocutory ruling. It shows that a person who runs a business for its owner can owe officer and fiduciary duties before becoming a director, that a family company receiving diverted money can be made to repay it, and that pleading fraud makes a case harder to prove.At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Sirtes J (first instance, after a trial in August 2026)Area of law: officers' duties under ss 181 and 182 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); fiduciary duties and knowing receipt; standard of proofDecision: 19 November 2026Outcome: Judgment of $1,180,763.52 plus interest; most cash claims failed; costs reserved ([4], [406])Standard applied: The balance of probabilities, applied with the care that serious allegations of fraud require ([127]–[128])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe company, Gratory Pty Ltd, operated a country hotel owned by Mr Pastrello's late father, who was its sole director and shareholder ([1]–[2], [7]). Mr Pastrello, the licensee since 2013, increasingly ran the hotel day to day as his father's health declined ([10]–[12]). He and his siblings became directors in February 2019 ([19]). Since 2024, court-appointed receivers and managers have controlled the company and brought these proceedings ([2], [29], [33]).The second defendant, La ... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=790">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/knxgjfun6i2uxw7pqya7zrgm5inpsc4a.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:11:21 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Shield law no bar to a notice to produce: redaction can protect a journalist's source]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=789]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=789]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In AB v CD (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1483, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Richmond J) dismissed, with costs, an application by a media publisher and a journalist to set aside a notice to produce. They argued that the notice was an abuse of process because it would undermine the journalist's privilege over a confidential source under s 126K of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The Court held that the notice was aimed at something else, namely whether another party knew about the proceedings, and that any material identifying the source could be redacted. The reasons were given ex tempore (orally, at the end of the hearing) and later revised. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Journalists in New South Wales can claim a statutory privilege, often called a "shield law", that protects the identity of their confidential sources. This ruling shows that the privilege does not automatically defeat every court process aimed at a media organisation. If a notice to produce is directed at a different, relevant issue, the usual answer is to produce the documents with the source-identifying parts redacted, not to set the notice aside.At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Duty List, Richmond J (first instance, interlocutory)Area of law: Civil procedure (notices to produce; abuse of process); evidence (journalist's privilege, Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126K)Decision type: Notice of motion to set aside a notice to produce, heard 12 November 2026, decided ex tempore on 13 November 2026 (reasons revised)Outcome: The motion was dismissed with costs ([13])Standard applied: Whether the documents sought have "apparent relevance" to the issues, and whether the notice solely seeks apparently privileged documents ([5], [10])Anonymisation: the Court uses AB, CD and EF; this digest keeps that and refers to the publisher and journalist by role only🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe plaintiff, AB, started the proceedings in late Oct... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=789">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/gvzfm7fqtsfegqvkzqgjequi2xhfxb48.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 06:45:25 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Defamation claim filed too early is dismissed: article was a fair summary of a coroner's decision]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=788]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=788]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Spencer v Australian Community Media &amp; Ors [2026] VSC 738, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Watson J) dismissed a defamation proceeding brought by Dr Peter Spencer over a 2023 news article about a decision of the Victorian State Coroner. Dr Spencer filed his claim before the publisher's time to offer to make amends had run out, so he needed leave under s 12B(3) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic). The Court held that his concerns notices were valid, but refused leave because the claim had no real prospect of success: the article was a substantially accurate summary of the Coroner's decision. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Before suing for defamation, a person must send the publisher a "concerns notice" and then wait for the period in which the publisher can offer to make amends. This case explains how much detail that notice needs, and what happens if you sue too early.At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Common Law Division, Major Torts List, Watson J (first instance)Area of law: Defamation; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) ss 12A, 12B, 26 and 28Decision type: Application for leave to commence a proceeding early, heard 24 July 2026, decided 16 November 2026Outcome: Leave refused and the proceeding dismissed as an abuse of process; costs to be agreed or argued in writing ([118]–[119])Standard applied: Whether it was "just and reasonable" to grant leave, including whether the claim had any reasonable prospect of success ([68], [89])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe Canberra Times published the article on 9 June 2023, the day after the State Coroner published a decision following an inquest into the death of Dr Spencer's wife. Its headline said a charge had been "recommended" ([2], [9]). The first defendant, Australian Community Media (ACM), publishes The Canberra Times and was the only defendant served ([9]).Much of Dr Spencer's complaint was really about the Coroner's decision itself ([3], [16]). His appeals against the... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=788">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/uqvquthn5xsmhcxtu226x93bss54spun.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:40:22 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the law says when police tell a journalist at a protest to move on]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=787]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=787]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>A letter of demand, published in full by Rebel News on 17 November 2026, says lawyers acting for journalist Avi Yemini have formally written to Victoria Police after he was, according to the letter, arrested twice at student protests outside the State Library of Victoria in Melbourne on 12 November 2026. The letter also includes a concerns notice under the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic). Nothing in the letter has been tested or proven in court, and as of the evening of 17 November 2026 AISLES could not find any public statement from Victoria Police about the letter itself. The move-on power discussed below is in section 6 of the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic).This post is a companion to AISLES's digest of Commissioner of Police v Hodgson [2026] NSWSC 1452, also at aisles.com.au. Hodgson was a court's pre-event decision about a notified NSW assembly. This matter is different: a Victorian journalist's civil demand after move-on directions and arrests at a protest, with no court finding yet.Why it matters: In Victoria, the everyday tools that decide what a journalist, or anyone else, can do at a protest include the move-on power, arrest without warrant, and the offence of hindering police. A letter of demand does not change that law.At a glanceWho: Avi Yemini, described in the letter as a journalist with Rebel News, and Victoria Police.Where: Student protests outside the State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, on 12 November 2026.What the letter alleges: Two arrests after a move-on direction; claims of false imprisonment and battery; and a defamation concerns notice about a Victoria Police statement. It says he was released without charge on both occasions.The letter's demands: $250,000 in compensation, legal costs, a written apology, an investigation of both arrests, and training on police powers and interactions with journalists at protests, with a response sought by Monday 23 November 2026.📣 What has been allegedEverything in this section is the account given in the lette... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=787">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/pk6tdfnxwvl5ehbgjmanenwpjdc4tqnn.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:09:26 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Harbour flotilla not prohibited: assembly rights outweighed real safety concerns]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=786]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=786]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Commissioner of Police (NSW Police Force) v Hodgson [2026] NSWSC 1452, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Muston J) refused an application by the Commissioner of Police to prohibit a planned public assembly on Newcastle Harbour. The Court accepted that the Commissioner's safety and disruption concerns were legitimate, but held that the public interest in political expression through assembly outweighed them. Participants who held the event substantially in accordance with the notice would keep the qualified immunity in the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: In New South Wales, organisers can notify police of a public assembly. If the notice is in order and the event is held substantially as notified, participants have a qualified immunity from certain offences, including obstructing a person, vehicle or vessel in a public place. Police can still ask a court to prohibit the assembly. This case shows that, for an on-water protest, real safety risks, a missing marine licence and some disruption all matter, but they do not automatically justify a ban.At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, Muston J (first instance, not an appeal)Area of law: Public assemblies (Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) Part 4); marine safety; police powersDecision type: Application under s 25 to prohibit a public assembly, heard 11 November 2026, decided 13 November 2026Outcome: The prohibition order was refused; the Commissioner was ordered to pay the defendant's costs ([62])Standard applied: The Act sets out no criteria. The Court balances free speech and public assembly against competing public interests, including safety and free passage ([25]–[26])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe defendant served a notice under s 23(1) of the Summary Offences Act on 17 September 2026, on behalf of Rising Tide, a Newcastle climate activist group that protests against the Port of Newcastle being used... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=786">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/ybabet7ax6wy5nsyn9ryxkdaxtu4fap5.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:06:27 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Criminal convictions can prove abuse in a civil claim, but their weight needs a new trial]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=785]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=785]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Estate of Croft v MTH [2026] HCA 44, the High Court of Australia unanimously allowed in part an appeal from the NSW Court of Appeal. A self-represented woman, known by the pseudonym MTH, sued the estate of her late foster carer for damages for abuse. He had been convicted of sexual offences against her before he died. The Court held that the trial judge was wrong to treat the convictions as no evidence of the abuse, because s 92(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) made them admissible to prove it. But the Court of Appeal was also wrong to decide the case "as if" a certificate of conviction had been tendered when none was. A new trial was ordered. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Many civil abuse claims follow a criminal conviction. In a civil case the conviction can prove that the offences happened, and the other side must point to something that answers it. But it is not automatically decisive: its weight is for the trial judge, and the claimant must still prove the case. The Court also clarified how far a judge must go to help a self-represented party.At a glanceCourt and level: High Court of Australia (final appeal court), five justicesArea of law: Evidence (convictions in civil proceedings); assault claims; appeals; self-represented litigantsDecision type: Appeal by special leave from the NSW Court of Appeal, heard 10 June 2026, decided 11 November 2026Outcome: Appeal allowed in part (5:0); judgment for the claimant against the estate set aside and a new trial ordered (Order 3)Reasons: one joint judgment of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ ([1]–[77])Standard of review: appeal by way of rehearing, a "real review of the trial" on the actual record ([48])Costs: the estate pays the amici curiae's costs; otherwise no order in the High Court; earlier costs await the new trial ([76])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundAs a teenager in State care, the claimant was placed in temporary foster care with the deceased and his... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=785">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/e8g3tgb3xlqdit5eh2grwhhdunqewgxw.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 22:13:29 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Trespass footage must be deleted, but a trust over copyright goes too far]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=784]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=784]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Farm Transparency International Limited v The Game Meats Company of Australia Pty Ltd [2026] HCA 42, the High Court of Australia unanimously allowed an appeal in part from the Full Court of the Federal Court. Animal-welfare campaigners had trespassed to film inside an abattoir. The Court set aside a declaration that they held copyright in the footage on trust for the abattoir, but held that damages were not enough and ordered them to permanently delete the images they still held. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: When someone films on private property without permission, the owner may want the footage destroyed and may want to stop anyone else using copies already in circulation. A court can order the trespasser to delete what they still hold if damages will not repair the continuing harm, but transferring copyright so the owner can sue third parties who were never brought into the case goes further than justice between the two parties requires.At a glanceCourt and level: High Court of Australia (final appeal court), seven justicesArea of law: Tort (trespass); equitable remedies; copyrightDecision type: Appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court, heard 5 May 2026, decided 11 November 2026Outcome: Appeal allowed in part (7:0). The constructive trust and assignment of copyright were set aside. A deletion order was made against the appellant, with a temporary publication restraint pending compliance. Trial damages standReasons: Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ proposed the orders ([66]–[129]); Gageler CJ and Gleeson J ([1]–[65]), Jagot J ([130]–[185]) and Beech-Jones J ([186]–[207]) agreedCosts: each party bears its own costs in the High Court; trial and Full Court costs were remitted ([127]–[128])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe respondent, The Game Meats Company of Australia Pty Ltd ("Game Meats"), operates a licensed abattoir at Eurobin, Victoria, processing game animals for export ([72], [130]). The appellant, Farm Transparency... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=784">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/jsid4hwpfjyc7uzfqdaxkwkpfmdzquvq.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 01:29:40 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Confidential tip to an insurer not protected: claims handling is a business, not a profession]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=783]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=783]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In MLC Limited v Preuss [2026] NSWSC 1424 the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Kunc J, Equity Division, Applications List) dealt with an insurer's attempt to keep a confidential informant's emails, and the informant's identity, from a man whose disability claim it was disputing, on the basis that they were "protected confidences" under ss 126A and 126B of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The Court held the insurer must produce the material without redaction, apart from documents covered by client legal privilege. The important point is that this protection needs a relationship between the person who confides and the person receiving the confidence, and that receiving information while handling insurance claims is not acting in a "professional capacity". All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: People often assume that telling an organisation something "in confidence" keeps it secret in later court proceedings. Confidentiality alone is not enough: the communication must be made within a relationship in which the recipient acts in a genuine professional capacity, and insurance claims handling does not qualify ([2], [23]–[27], [34]–[35]).At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Applications List (single judge, first instance)Area of law: Evidence; privileges; professional confidential relationship privilege (protected confidences)Decision type: Ex tempore (oral) interlocutory ruling on producing documents, 3 November 2026 (hearings 30 October and 2 November 2026)Outcome: The communications were not protected confidences; the insurer must produce the material caught by the notice without redaction, other than documents covered by client legal privilege ([4], [36])Test applied: Statutory construction of the definition of "protected confidence" in s 126A, read by text, context and purpose ([23])Costs: The judgment does not deal with costs🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe plaintiff, MLC Limited (now known as Acenda... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=783">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/dhsusujmjvynyhmtdkpadrtchuu3xqjd.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 23:28:30 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Interim life-support order lifted: the court's protective power serves the patient's best interests]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=782]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=782]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Marijancevic v Melbourne Health [2026] VSC 729, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Clements J, Common Law Division, Practice Court) dealt with an urgent application by a self-represented man who asked the Court to stop a public hospital from withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from his brother, who was in intensive care with a severe traumatic brain injury. The Court made an unopposed interim order on a Friday evening to keep treatment going, then lifted it four days later and dismissed the proceeding. The important point is that the Court's protective power is exercised in the patient's own best interests, not those of family or the hospital, and courts are slow to override careful, independent medical judgment. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: When a family and an intensive care team disagree about end-of-life care, a court can act quickly to hold the position, but it then asks, on the medical evidence, what is in the patient's best interests and whether there is a serious question to be tried ([4], [34], [53]). It is not a decision about any general "right to die" or euthanasia.At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Common Law Division, Practice Court (single judge, urgent interlocutory hearing)Area of law: Practice and procedure; interim injunctions; parens patriae (protective) jurisdiction; medical treatmentDecision type: Ex tempore ruling on 27 October 2026 on whether to continue an interim injunction; reasons published 9 November 2026Outcome: Interim injunction of 23 October 2026 lifted from 4:30pm on 27 October 2026; proceeding dismissed ([53], [57])Test applied: Serious question to be tried, then balance of convenience; the protective jurisdiction is guided by the patient's best interests ([34], [37], [46])Costs: No order as to the costs of the proceeding ([57])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundThe patient, a 68-year-old man, was admitted to the Royal Melbourne Hospital on 8 October 2026 after reportedly being st... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=782">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/rlnkznbqcubxi6qwfzcjh9f6qvlilyfb.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 22:40:30 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Airport officer who saw a fatal crash then watched the CCTV is owed a duty]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=781]]></link><guid><![CDATA[https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=781]]></guid><description><![CDATA[<p>In Salma v Transport Accident Commission [2026] VSC 688, the Supreme Court of Victoria (Tsalamandris J, Common Law Division, Personal Injuries List) decided whether a negligent driver owed a duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury to an airport control-room officer who saw and heard a fatal collision, then repeatedly viewed the CCTV as part of coordinating the emergency response. The Court held that a duty was owed, and that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for his psychiatric injury. The important point is that this was not framed as a novel duty to anyone who later watches crash footage: the officer's first-hand sensory perception, his workplace role and the immediate aftermath were treated together. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Psychiatric injury claims after someone else's death or injury turn on reasonable foreseeability. This ruling shows a duty can arise where the plaintiff was not a traditional "rescuer" at the wreck, but still saw and heard a major crash and then had to watch graphic footage as part of the emergency response ([92]–[96]).At a glanceCourt and level: Supreme Court of Victoria, Common Law Division, Personal Injuries List (single judge, first instance)Area of law: Negligence; psychiatric injury (nervous shock); duty of careDecision type: Trial judgment on liability (duty); quantum agreed if duty foundOutcome: Duty owed; plaintiff entitled to damages for psychiatric injury ([6], [96])Standard of proof: Balance of probabilities (actual persuasion under the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 140) ([82])Costs: Not dealt with in these reasons; form of orders still to be heard ([100])🧩 Facts and IssuesBackgroundOn 30 June 2021, Dennis Wu drove through a red light at Terminal Drive and Centre Road in the landside precinct of Tullamarine Airport and collided with a double tipper truck. Mr Wu died. His passenger was seriously injured. The accident was due to his negligence in failing to obey the red light ([1], [9]–[13])... <a href="https://aisles.com.au/page/view-post?id=781">Read more</a></p><img src="https://aisles.com.au/s/bx_posts_photos_resized/nwhxmdbuh5sjptqd8mx6uxefb6rjec7c.png" />]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 22:19:50 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>